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Cyclical Weakness or Secular Decline?
Primary commodities still account for the bulk of exports in many devel-
oping countries. However, real commodity prices have been declining
almost continuously since the early 1980s. The appropriate policy response
to a terms of trade shock depends importantly on whether the shock is
perceived to be temporary or permanent. Our results indicate that the
recent weakness in commodity prices is mostly secular, stressing the need
for commodity exporting countries to concentrate on export diversification
and other structural policies. There is, however, scope for stabilization
funds and the use of hedging strategies, since the evidence also suggests
commodity prices have become more volatile. [JEL C22, E3, E61]
PRIMARY COMMODITIES still account for the bulk of exports in manydeveloping countries. In effect. the reliance on primary commodities
as the main source of export earnings has not diminished for many
countries. particularly in Africa. where manufactures often account for
less than 15 percent of merchandise exports (see Table 1). However. real
commodity prices have been declining almost continuously since the early
19805.1 Since their short-lived recovery in 1984, real commodity prices
• Cannen M. Reinhart is an Economist in the Research Department. She holds
a Ph.D. from Columbia University. Peter Wickham. Chief, Commodities and
Special Issues Division of the Research Department. received his undergraduate
degree. from the University of Essex and subsequently studied at the University
of British Columbia and the Johns Hopkins University. The authors would like
to thank Eduardo Borensztein. John Cuddington. Mohsin Khan, and Jonathan
Ostry for helpful comments and suggestions, and Ximena Cheetham for excellent
research assistance.
I Unless otherwise noted. real commodity prices refer to the IMF all non-fuel
commodity price index deflated by the IMF mdex of manufacturing export unit
values (MEUV) of industrial countries. Both indices are in U.S. dollars.
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Table 2. Real Export Earnings'
(Average annual percent change)
Country
Africa
Burundi
C6te d'Ivoire
Kenya
Mauritania
Senegal
Tanzania
3.7
6.1
-3.0
-6.6
-0.9
-2.7
-3.7
-8.2
-5.4
13.2
3.6
-5.6
Asia
Malavsia
Pakis"tan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
8.1
6.1
3.5
5.9
10.7
Latin America
Argentina 2.5
Bolivia 9.1
Brazil 7.4
Colombia 7.4
Mexico 11.3
Uruguay 0.5
. Sources: International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook, various
Issues.
~Real export earnings are defined as the value of exports deflated by import
umt values.
2.2
-0.7
4.68.5
5.6
4.3
have fallen by about 45 percent. translating into a sharp deterioration in
the terms of trade for most commodity exporters. Not surprisingly, the
performance of real export earnings for many developing countries dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s has been closely linked to the countries' success
in diversifying their export base. Z As Table 2 indicates for a selected group
of countries. the Asian experience is characterized by a marked shift
toward the export of manufactures and strong increases in real export
earnings; at the other extreme. Africa can be generally described as a
2 Export diversification is not the only factor explaining the marked regional
differences in export performance. however. As will be discussed below, the
volume of exports of agricultural commodities surged in Asia during the 1970s
and 19805 while it declined in Africa during the same period.
situation in which continued reliance on primary commodity exports has
resulted in a marked and persistent deterioration in real export earnings.
As Figure 1 illustrates. during 1992 the prices of commodities relative
to those of manufactures reached their lowest levels in over 90 years.)
Thus. a casual perusal of the evolution of real commodity prices seems
to support the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, which posits that the long-
term trend of the prices of primary commodities relative to the prices of
manufactures is negative. Empirical evidence of the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis is. thus far. not conclusive, and this issue has been addressed
in a number of papers, including Cuddington and Urzua (1989), Powell
(1991). and Ardeni and Wright (1992). Some studies point to the presence
of a downward trend. whereas others argue that prices have been subject
to one or more structural breaks in which average prices were perma-
nently lower following the break(s). Of more practical concern to the
policymaker. the presence of a negative trend or a series of downward
shifts in prices implies that efforts to stabilize the incomes of commodity
producers for an extended period must take into account the fact that
real commodity prices have not shown signs of fluctuating around a
constant mean.
The aim of this paper is to provide the general stylized facts about
the behavior of commodity prices that may be useful in formulating the
policy response to commodity price shocks. For instance, as noted by
Cuddington and Urzua (1989) and Deaton (1992), the usefulness of a
stabilization fund will depend crucially on whether the shocks to com-
modity prices are primarily temporary or permanent. Further, even if
temporary shocks playa dominant role, the ability to stabilize will depend
on the persistence of shocks and the duration of cycles. Similarly, as
Ghosh and Ostry (1994) argue, the benefits that can be obtained from
stabilization funds, or more generally, from precautionary savings will be
greater in a more volatile an<:luncertain environment. The more un-
certain a country's export revenue stream, the greater is the value to
that country of accumulat:ng assets to insure itself against future
shocks. Hedging strategies alSO acquire greater importance as volatility
and uncertainty increase.
This paper examines these issues using quarterly data for 1957:1-
1993:II for some of the major commodity groupings: an all non-oil
)The sustained decline predates our sample period of 1900-92. Using a differ-
ent commodity index that beginsin 1854, Boughton (1991) documents the decline
of real commodity prices during the second half of the ninetee!1thcentury. The
source of the data plotted in Figure 1 is Grilli and Yang (1988) for 1900-86 and
was updated by the authors for 1987-92.
Sources: Grilli and Yang (1988) and International Monetary Fund.
Note: Commodity prices are deflated by the expon unit values of
manufactured goods.
commodity basket, beverages, food. and metals. A number of empirical
regularities emerge from the analysis. First, alternative methods of de-
composing time-series into their secular (trend) and cyclical (temporary)
components yield a common result-the recent weakness in real com-
modity prices is primarily of a secular, persistent nature and is not the
product of a large temporary deviation from trend. The above observa-
tion suggests that a rebound in real commodity prices to their pre-1980s
level, while possible, does not appear probable. Second, the relative
importanct: of permanent shocks varies considerably across commodity
groupings: whereas permanent shocks account for only 30 percent of the
variance of metals prices. they account for about 85 percent of the
variance of beverage prices. Third. the characteristics of the cycle also
vary markedly across commodities. Shocks are the least persistent for
metals and the most persistent for beverages. The previous two observa-
tions suggest that the scope for stabilization policies is very commodity
specific. Last, the volatility in commodity prices has risen steadily and
considerably since the early 1970s, particularly for the once relatively
stable food grouping.
Section I presents a quantitative measure of the relative importance of
permanent (versus temporary) shocks in explaining the variation in real
commodity prices and examines how the volatility of commodity prices
has evolved over time. The analysis in Section II aims to disentangle to
what extent the recent weakness in commodity prices reflects cyclical
forces (related to, say, recession in several of the industrial countries) and
to what degree the weakness is secular and due to more persistent causes
(technological change, for instance). The characteristics of the cycle are
also examined. Section III briefly summarizes the major factors behind
the observed weakness in commodity prices. Policy implications for
countries adjusting to terms of trade shocks are taken up in Section IV.
As noted earlier. the design and feasibility of stabilization and hedging
strategies depend very much on the nature of the shock. At the risk of
oversimplifying, income stabilization policies and hedging are useful in
dealing only with temporary and, preferably, short-lived shocks. Perma-
nent shocks require adjustment and, possibly, the implementation of
structural policies. To determine how important a role, if any, permanent
shocks play in explaining the variability in commodity prices, we proceed
in two steps. First. we establish the time-series properties of the various
commodity indices via the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests under two alternative hypoth-
eses: the first of these assumes no structural breaks occurred within the
sample; the second allows for a one-time break in both the mean and the
trend at a pre-specified point in time (see Perron (1989)).4 If the series
is stationary, all shocks are temporary and the null hypothesis of a unit
root is rejected. If the null hypothesis is not rejected. the series has a
permanent component of unknown size. Second, to determine the size
of the permanent component we employ Cochrane's (1988) methodol-
ogy, which provides a measure of the persistence of shocks to a variable
by examining the variance of its long differences.
The form of the ADF test employed. given by equation (1), allows for
both the presence of a constant (nonzero mean) and a constant determin-
istic drift. To ensure that the regression residuals are serially uncorre-
lated, past differences of the variable (denoted by Ll) are also included.
As suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991), we begin by induding a
generous number of lags; if the past differences do not enter significantly,
these lags are dropped sequentially. The PP test, which allows for more
general forms of heteroskedasticity, also allows for constant and drift
terms:
k
LlYr = ~ + f3t + aYr-l + 2: l)jLly,_, + e,.
i:zl
The results of the unit root tests, which are summarized in Table 3,
uniformly indicate that, when no breaks are assumed. for the log of the
price series examined the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be
rejected at standard confidence levels.s Perron (1989), however. has
suggested that it is important to model large "shocks" that may result in
a one-time break in either the level or the slope (or both of these) of
macroeconomic time-series when testing for unit roots. He shows that
standard unit root tests have little power to distinguish between non-
stationarity and stationarity around a broken trend. The 1973 oil price
shock. for instance. may have had persistent effects on real commodity
prices.
To examine this possibility, the deterministic component was modeled
Alternative hypothesis: no structural breaks
k
Regression: ~.Vr = I.l. + I3t + aYr-t + 2: Oj~Yr-, T er
,-I
(-statistic on a Phillips-Perron
Series k (ADF statistic) statistic
All commodities 5 -2.1353 -2.6112
Beverages 5 -2.5308 -1.4472
Food 3 -1.8665 -2.4743
Metals 1 -3.3555 -3.2849
Critical values (percent) 1 5 10
150observations· -3.73 -3.46 -3.16
Alternative hypothesis: one-time structural break occurring at TB
Alternative Hypothesis: Yr = I.l.\ + l3\t + (1.l.2 - I.l.t)DU, (132 - I3t)DTr + e"
where DU = DT = 0 if I :s TB and DU = 1, DT = ( if t > TB
k
Regression: aYr = aYr-1 + 2: o,.aYr_. + er
;-1
Critical values
T-statistic a Phillips- (percent)b
Series TB (ADF) Perron A 1 5 10
All commodities 73:1 -6.449 -3.659 0.4 -4.81 -4.22 -3.95
Beverages 76:1 -3.353 -3.955 0.5 -4.90 -4.24 -3.96
Food - 73:1 -4.082 -3.949 0.4 -4.81 -4.22 -3.95
Metals 74:III -4.558 -4.306 0.5 -4.90 -4.24 -3.96
a The cmical values are taken from Guilkev and Schmidt (1989). The number
of observations in the sample period is 146..
bThese are taken from Perron (1989). Figure A.1 plots the fitted broken trends
to the data.
to incorporate a single structural break, at which time both the level and
the slope of the deterministic component changed; the dummy variables
DU and DT capture the shifts in the average price and the slope of the
time trend, respectively. As in Perron (1989), the sample behavior of the
data was allowed to indicate where the "potential" break (denoted in
Table 3 by TB) occurred. These breaks are timed closely with the oil shock
for all commodities, food, and metals. For beverages, the coffee boom
that was caused by frost damage came to an end in 1977 and appears the
best candidate for a behavioral change. The exact time of the break is
shown in the first column of the bottom panel of Table 3. Under the
alternative hypothesis. DU = DT = 0 if t s TB and DU = 1, DT = t
if t> TB• Prices and their respective deterministic broken trends are
plotted in Figure A.I.
The Perron test proceeds in two steps: the first estimates the parame-
ters associated with the deterministic components (the ~j and ~i); in the
second step the ADF (drift and trend terms are omitted) is performed
on the de-trended series, denoted by y in Table 3. The appropriate
critical value will depend on the time of the break relative to total sam-
ple size, >... As Table 3 shows. the results of the Perron unit root tests
indicate that the metal index is stationary around the broken trend
whereas for the food and beverages indices. the unit root hypothesis
cannot be rejected. The results for all commodities are ambiguous. but
the more powerful Phillips-Perron tests indicate nonstationarity. How-
ever, the power of the Perron tests has recently come into question (see
Zivot and Andrews (1992)), and these results should therefore be inter-
preted with care. Given (1) the ambiguities about the exact time-series
properties of some of the commodity price indices (all commodities and
metals), (2) the more general concerns about the power of the Perron
test, (3) the lack of consensus in the literature about the existence and
timing of breaks, we proceed under the hypothesis that the series in
question has a unit root component.6
However, as the unit root tests are silent on the size and relative
importance of the permanent component, we proceed to shed light on
this issue by employing the methodology proposed by Cochrane (1988).
Specifically, if the variable y has the following representation,
Yr = 0Yr-I + €or, where €or - N(O, cr;), (2)
if 0 = 1 and the disturbance term. €o. is white noise. then y follows a
random walk and the variance of its k-differences grows linearly with the
difference
var(y, - Yr-t) = kcr;. (3)
If 0 < 1, so Y is a stationary process, the variance of its k-differences is
given by
var(y, - y,-t) = cr;(1 - 02.\:)/(1 - 01). (4)
6 As discussed below. the main stylized facts that emerge, as well as the policy
implications, will not change considerably if the Perron test results are taken at
face value and the indices for all commodities and metals are treated as stationary
around a broken trend. For the food and beverage indices, this is not an issue.
as all the test results uniformly indicate the existence of a unit root.
Therefore. the ratio (lIk)var(y, - Y'_k)/var(y, - Yt-I) is equal to one if y
is a random walk. If y is stationary, all shocks eventually die out. so the
variance ratio converges to zero. If y is a more general 1(1) process, which
has both permanent and temporary (stationary) components, the ratio
will converge to the ratio of the variance of the permanent shock to the
total variance of y. Thus, the closer that ratio is to unity, the larger is the
size of the unit root component, and the lower is the relative importance
of temporary shocks. In the limiting case, where the ratio converges to
unity, there would be no scope for stabilization policies, since all shocks
are permanent. The presence of an important temporary component,
however, does not guarantee that price and/or income stabilization poli-
cies will be feasible. since persistence in the temporary component may
be so high as to make stabilization extremely costly. Hence, as regards
stabilization policies, "temporariness" is a necessary but not sufficient
condition.
Table 4 summarizes the main results. The values of k range between
1and 20 years. For each of the four commodity indices, permanent shocks
play a role in explaining the variance of commodity prices. However,
their relative importance varies considerably across commodity group-
ings and just as much within groupings (see Cuddington (1992». Perma-
nent shocks are least imponant for metals (29 percent of the variance of
yearly changes) and most important for beverages (85 percent). The
index for all commodities, reflecting the differing characteristics of its
components, falls in the middle of the range, with permanent shocks
accounting for about 45 percent of the variance of yearly changes.7 For
the two price indices with the largest unit root component-beverages
and food-the ratio took the longest number of years to converge,
possibly indicating that even the temporary component of these series
exhibits a high degree of persistence.
As this methodology is based entirely on the univariate behavior of the
variable. it does not discriminate among types or sources of temporary
shocks. For example, it does not distinguish between a temporary shock
owing to a recession in :he industrial countries and a temporary shock
owing to a bumper crop. Such a distinction would require a structural
model of commodity prices (see Borensztein and Reinhart (1994».
7This result is in line with the findingsof Cuddington and Urzua (1989), who.
using annual data for this index for 1900-83, find that about 39 percent of the
shocks to real commodity prices are permanent.
Table 4. 11k Times the Variance of k-Differences. 1957-92"
l/k«J;I<T~) for various k (years)
8 10
1.032 0.465 0.524 0.448
(0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026)
Beverages
1.176 1.220 0.904 0.998 1.260 0.846
(0.007) (0.013) (0.025) (0.029) (0.033) (0.039)
Food
1.188 0.816 0.682 0.613 0.731
(0.007) (0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
Metals
1.099 0.481 0.333 0.287
(0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026)
•Annual data were used. All commodity price indices are deflated by the
export unit values of manufactures. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
standard errors were tabulated from Monte Carlo simulations (600 replications)
for n = 35 and k = 10, 12, and 20 under the null hypothesis of a random walk.
In addition to assessing whether a commodity price is driven primarily
by permanent or transitory shocks. other aspects of the nature of the
shocks have to be considered when designing policy. For instance, even
if the price is stationary around a deterministic trend (so all shocks are
temporary), there are relatively few gains from setting up a stabilization
fund and/or hedging if the variance of prices is small and large shocks are
rare. The benefits to be obtained from stabilization funds, or, more
generally, from precautionary savings will increase in a more volatile and
uncertain environment, because greater uncertainty in a country's export
revenue stream increases the value to that country of accumulating assets
to insure itself against future shocks (Ghosh and Ostry (1994». Similarly,
hedging strategies acquire greater importance as volatility increases and
the probability of large destabilizing shocks is high. To examine these
issues, we focus on the sample moments of the price series of interest.
Table 5. Changing Variance of Commodiry Prices:
Tests for Heteroskedasticiry, 1959:1-1993:Ir
ARCH test X2(1)= 7.683
(0.005)
.Breusch-Pagan test l(3) = 6.377
(0.095)
White's test l(5) = 11.034
(0.051)
•Owing to the nonstationarity of the data, the tests were performed on the
log-differences of the real all-commodityprice index.
To examine. the issue of rising volatility, we first test for the presence
of heteroskedastic disturbances and then review the descriptive statis-
tics of commodity prices over different sample periods. The tests for
heteroskedasticity on the log-differences of real commodity prices (the
results for all commodities are reported in Table S) uniformly reject
the null hypothesis that the shocks to commodity prices are identically
distributed during the sample period.8
These results are consistent with the picture that emerges from
Table 6, which presents the evolution of the basic descriptive statistics of
the real commodity indices over three subsamples. Several features are
worth noting. First, the average price is markedly lower during the most
recent sample, consistent with the presence of a negative trend. Second,
there is a sustained and sharp increase in the variance of commodity
prices.9 This increase is evident in all the indices but is most pronounced
in the all commodities and food groupings. to The coefficient of variation
rises sharply as prices become more volatile around a falling mean: for
food the increase in the coefficient of variation is sixfold. Figure 2. which
plots the coefficients of variation (based on a moving IS-year sample) for
I972:I-1993:II, also highlights the marked rise in volatility. Not SllrpriS-
8The same tests performed on the entire 1900-92 period do not indicate
heteroskedastic disturbances. Volatilitywashigh in the pre-WorldWar II period.
diminished drastically during the 1950sand 1960s, and rose again in the early
1970s. Henc.e, shocks to commodity prices were relatively small only in a sub-
s~ple Wlthina penod of 90 years. Not surprisingly, the tests for heteroskedas-
tlCltydo not find that shocks to commodity prices were smaller at the begInmng
of the sample than at the end. .
9This feature has also been discussed in Deaton (1992) and Deaton and
Laroque (1992).
10 For a rational expectations model that is capable of generating predictions
that match some .of the o~~ervedcharacteristics of commodity price behavior
descnbed here (high volatlhty, skewness. and excess kurtosis), see Deaton and
Laroque (1992).
exchange system and on the heels of the first oil shock. However, volatil-
ity has remained high during the 1980s and 1990s. Stuctural models often
link oil prices and the U.S. real exchange rate to real commodity prices
(see, for instance. Borensztein and Reinhart (1994». Hence, the chang-
ing structure of the oil industry since the early 1970s-which has con-
tributed to sharp increases in the volatility of oil prices-and the switch
to a floating exchange rate regime-which has increased the volatility of
other key relative prices such as real exchange rates (see Mussa (1986)}--
are likely to be important factors in explaining the more volatile behavior
of commodity prices since the early 1970s. Last, the evidence on the
probability of large shocks is mixed: the distributions of commodity
prices were characterized by excess kurtosis (fat tails) during the 1970s,
as large shocks became more commonplace. II However, the more recent
sample is characterized by relatively infrequent realizations of large
shocks.
The aim of this section is to give some idea of how much the recent
weakness in commodity prices is associated with reversible cyclical
forces, or how much it is part of a longer-term secular decline. We employ
alternative methodologies to address this issue, and the main reason for
such an eclectic approach is to determine whether the results are sensitive
to the choice of technique. The persistence and other features of the cycle
are also examined.
If a unit root is present, admissible ways of disentangling trend from
cycle are either by the methodology proposed by Beveridge and Nelson
(1981) or by the structural time-series approach associated with Harvey
(1985), as both of these approaches allow for the presence of a stochastic
trend. We next apply, in turn, both of these approaches.
First, employing the Beveridge-Nelson (B-N) technique (Beveridge
and Nelson (1981)) as modified by Miller (1988), we decompose the real
11This issue is not trivial, as excess kurtosis increases the value of precautionary
saving. For example. for a level of consumption sufficiently close to subsistence.
a large adverse shock in the absence of precautionary saving could have devastat-
ing effects.
commodity price into its "permanent" (or steady-state) component and
its "temporary" (or cyclical component), denoted by z and c, respec-
tively. As discussed above, the identifying criteria for this technique is
that the former captures the nonstationary component of the variable,
while the latter captures its stationary element. Hence,
The evolution of the permanent component is given by
(1 - el - e~- .. '-6q) (6)az, = ~ + ----------~,'
(1 - <PI - <P2 - ... -<pp)
where e and <I> are the parameters describing the ARMA process. Using
the estimates of e, <1>, and ~. the path of the permanent component is
constructed. The cyclical component is calculated residually as the differ-
ence between the estimated permanent component. z, and the actual
values of y.!2
Using the Box-Ljung Q statistic as a guideline. the ARMA processes
were selected to whiten the error. In general the longer ARMA processes
provided the best fit.!3 At the quarterly frequency, an ARMA(20,4)
process was fitted to the all commodities and beverages groupings, while
food and metals were characterized by ARMA(16,4) processes. Table 7
reports the full estimation results for the annual frequency and the main
diagnostics of the quarterly estimation. Figure 3 plots the actual series
along with the estimated permanent component. For example, large
deviations from trend were evident in the indices for all commodities.
food, and metals during 1973, at the time of the first oil shock. For
beverages. the largest deviations from trend during the sample took place
during 1977 and are associated with a supply shock.!4 As Figure 3 illus-
trates. except for the metals basket. for which the actual price has been
below trend since late 1990, actual prices for all other indices are close
to their permanent trend component. Figure 3 also illustrates that the
evolution of the permanent component changes considerably during the
course of the sample. Whereas during the 1960s and up to the first oil
shock all prices were relatively stable. the trend has become markedly
negative since the mid-1970s (somewhat later for beverages).
An alternative approach to decomposing a time-series into its stochas-
tic trend and cycle is associated with Harvey (1985). This structural
12For additional details see Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and Miller (1988).
13For a discussion of the problems associated with fitting low ARMA processes
to macroeconomic data. see Cochrane (1988).
. 14Since coffee has a large weight in the beverage index, this price spike is
associated with a severe frost in Brazil.
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics. 1957:1-1993:Ir
Sample period 1957:1-1969:IV 1970:1-1979:IV 1980:I-1993:1I
Number of observations 52 4D 54
All commodities
Mean 4.714 4.705 4.386
Variance 0.001 0.017 0.031
Coefficient of variation 0.789 2.806 4.036
Skewness 1.275 1.291 -0.061
(0.000) (0.001) (0.859)
Kurtosis 1.939 1.019 -1.386
(0.008) (0.229) (0.052)
Beverages
Mean 4.573 4.668 4.203
Variance 0.018 0.112 0.199
Coefficient of variation 2.974 7.178 10.611
Skewness 1.152 0.979 -0.411
(0.001) (0.015) (0.230)
Kurtosis 0.083 0.396 -1.254
(0.909) (0.640) (0.078)
Food
Mean 4.766 4.789 4.341
Variance 0.002 0.042 0.053
Coefficient of variation 0.839 4.280 5.300
Skewness 0.428 1.129 0.138
(0.221) (0.005) (0.687)
Kurtosis -0.096 0.338 -1.526
(0.901) (0.690) (0.032)
Metals
Mean
Variance
Coefficient of variation
Skewness
4.819 4.677 4.412
0.008 0.016 0.024
1.868 2.737 3.490
0.619 1.299 -0.250
(0.039) (0.001) (0.467)
-0.280 1.638 -0.802
(0.700) (0.053) (0.260)
•The variables are the logs of the commodity index deflated by the export unit
value of manufactures. The statistics are sample moments; owing to potential
nonstationarity, the population moments may not be well defined. The numbers
in parentheses are probability values under the null hypothesis of normality.
ingly, the sharpest increases in volatility appear to have taken place
during the early 1970s following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
Figure 2. Rising Volatility in Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices
(Coefficients oi variation)
5 12lAll Commodilies Beverages
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Sources: IMF.lntem.'l·ioTUJl FiTUJncial Statistics. and the authors.
Note: The coefficier.~ -t variation is based on IS-year moving averages and IS-year
standard deviations that .::c backward looking; the observation for 1972:1. for instance.
is based on data from 1957:I1-1972:I.
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Figure 3. Real Non-Oil Commodiry Prices: Trends and Cycles
Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition
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time-series approach relies on the Kalman filter. In this trend plus cycle
model, the stochastic trend or permanent component. z" can be modeled
as15
Z, = Z,_I + 13r-1 + TJ" 1'1,- nid(O, a~)
13, = 13,-1 + E, E, - nid(O, a;),
where TJ, and E, are mutually independent, normally distributed white-
noise disturbances. The cycle is given by
[~:.] = p[ -~~~~ ~~~~][~: = i.] + [::.].
Os A S 11', 0 S psI,
where, as before. c, is the cyclical component. w, and w,· are uncorrelated
white-noise disturbances. and c.* appears by construction (see Harrison
and Akram (1983)). The parameters A and p describe the frequency of
the cycle and the damping factor on the amplitude of the cycle, re-
spectively. Using the Kalman filter, the parameters (A, p, a~, a;, a~)
are estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) in the time or frequency
domains.
The estimates of the structural time-series model present a similar
scenario to the B-N decomposition. Figure 4 plots the permanent compo-
nent produced by this technique alongside the actual price series; as
before, the bulk of the recent price weakness is associated with the
secular component and there is no evidence of an abnormally large
cycle. The most substantive differences between the results from the two
methods are that (1) the Kalman-filter approach produces smoother
trend components for the beverages and food groupings, and, hence, a
somewhat more volatile cycle. and (2) metals prices during 1993 are
closer to trend using the structural time-series approach than using the
B-N decomposition. However, even giving the results of the Perron tests
a higher weight and treating the indices for all commodities and metals
as stationary about a broken trend, the main implications about trends
and cycles remain. As Figure A.1 in the appendix indicates. the recent
weakness does not appear to be of a primarily cyclical nature.
Figure 5 plots the cycles generated by the two methods: as noted
earlier, the similarities are strong. In effect, the pairwise correlations
Figure 4. Real Commodity Prices: Trends and Cycles
Structural Time-Series Decomposition
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Figure 5. Real Commodity Prices: Cycles
(Beveridge-Nelson Cycle (left panel) versus Ka\man Filter Cycle (right panel))
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between the cycles generated by the two approaches are quite high: 0.95
for all commodities, 0.87 for beverages, 0.90 for food, and 0,87 for
metals. 16 It is also evident from these figures that the cycles are ccrrelated
across commodity groupings. showing the high degree of CO-ii:.ovement
in commodic ~rices. Cycles in all commodities are highly correlated
(correlations <J.iJove0.80) with cycles in food and metals. Beverages
exhibit the most idiosyncratic behavior. as cycles appear to be primarily
driven by supply shocks.
As noted earlier, the temporary shocks that drive the cycle can exhibit
differing degrees of persistence. Stabilization funds are better suited to
smoothing out short-lived shocks: the more persistent the shock. the
greater are the costs of maintaining an "artificially" high internal price
(assuming the shock had tended to depress prices). To examine this issue.
we first fit an AR process to the cyclical component.17 The estimated
model was then used to generate impulse responses that allow us to
visualize the time it takes for the effects of the shock to disappear (or
become arbitrarily small). Figure 6 plots the impulse responses based on
the estimated AR processes. 18Although the full effects of the shock may
take longer to disappear. for practical purposes we will focus on the time
it takes for these effects to become smaller than some arbitrary cutoff.
say plus/minus 0.02 of a unitary shock. after which the impact of the shock
isminimal. Based on these considerations. shocks are the least persistent
for metals (reaching the cutoff in 6 to 7 quarters) and the most persistent
for beverages (12 to 13 quarters).19
General Observations on the Time-Series Properties
of Commodity Prices
A series of recent papers. including Cuddington and Urzua (1989).
Powell (1991). Ardeni and Wright (1992). and Deaton and Laroque
(1992). analyze the behavior of real commodity prices. These papers.
which give careful consideration to modeling the time-series properties
of commodity prices (usually for long-run annual data-see Figure 1),
often present contradictory results. There is little consensus on whether
16,These co~elations are not spurious, since. by construction. the cycles are
statlonarv senes.
17The Schwarz criterion was employed to select the appropriate specification.
18The estimated AR processes are not reported. but the results are available
from the authors.
19The scaies in the panels of Figure 6 are not uniform across commodities. with
beverages having the widest scale (reflecting the higher variance of its cycle) and
all commodities having the narrowest.
Figure 6. Impulse Responses: Persistence in the Cycle
Beveridge-Nelson Cycle (left panell versus Kalman Filter Cycle (right panell
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Note: These impulse responses are based on the estimated AR processes.
real commodity prices are stationary or not or when, if any, structural
breaks have taken place.
Similar ambiguities arise from the analysis of the quarterly postwar
data used in this study. There is. however. one robust finding in the
empirical work-real commodity prices exhibit a high degree of persis-
tence, and the high autocorrelation in the data is well documented.
Although ambiguities about the exact time-series properties of real com-
modity prices remain, a number of practical implications still emerge
from an analysis of their time-series behavior. First, whether the trend
component is modeled by a simple broken deterministic linear trend
(Figure A.l in the appendix) or by a stochastic process using alternative
methodologies (this section). the recent decline in commodity prices
appears to be primarily secular (Figures 3. 4, and A.l all illustrate this
point). Contrary to the findings of Boughton (1991), no evidence in any
of the decompositions indicates that the recent price weakness is part of
an anomalous cycle, which suggests that the prospects for a sharp re-
covery in real commodity prices to pre-1980 levels are somewhat dim.
Second, irrespective of the technique used, the downward trend has
obviously steepened in recent years. implying that the design of stabiliza-
tion efforts should incorporate this feature of commodity price behavior.
Third, whereas for some of the indices (all commodities and metals) the
results on stationarity are not clear cut, from a practical policy standpoint
this distinction may not be relevant. As noted earlier, the success of
stabilization funds requires shocks to be temporary. However, if a shock
is temporary, but its effects persist for many years, price stabilization may
be equally costly.
The previous sections have focused exclusively on the univariate prop-
erties of real commodity prices. No attempt has been made to link the
behavior of commodity prices to other economic time-series, as in Chu
and Morrison (1986), and, more recently, Borensztein and Reinhart
(1994) through a structural model. This section does not aim to provide
a structural framework; its purpose is briefly to identify and list the factors
that are likely to explain the behavior of commodity prices, including
factors that are often ignored in the empirical literature (usually because
they are less amenable to quantification). Although some developments
are likely to have an impact simultaneously on both the trend and the
cycle of real commodity prices, an attempt is made in this section to
identify which factors are likely to be linked primarily to the trend
(specifically, the persistent weakness since the late 1970s) and which are
predominantly associated with the cycle.
Secular Developments
Economic Growth and the Demand for Commodities
Analyses of commodity market developments have usually focused on
the macroeconomic conditions in industrial countries as the principal
factor affecting commodity prices. Given the role of many commodities
as inputs for production by manufacturing industries, their demand is
closely related to the level of industrial economic activity, the major part
of which takes place in industrial countries. Therefore, the trend decline
in real commodity prices is at least partially related to the marked and
secular slowdown in the growth of output in the industrial countries in
the early 1970s, with 1973 constituting the end of the strong postwar
expansion phase for most countries.2O
In addition to the slowdown in growth, a declining intensity of resource
use in industrial countries has contributed to reduced rates of growth in
the demand for commodities, particularly metals. TIlton (1990) has
shown that this pattern holds for a large number of countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Various explanations have been put forward for the trends observed in
the intensity of metals use in the industrial countries. Some of these stress
the changing composition of output: the shift from manufacturing to
services; the declining share in GDP of gross domestic investment, which
ismore metal intensive than other components of expenditure; and, more
recently, declines in the defense-related industries. Other explanations
focus on the role of resource-saving technologies and the process of
materials substitution.
Much less is known about intensity of metals use outside the industrial
countries. For the countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), Dobozi (1990) shows that the period of growing
metals consumption and rising intensity of use also came to an end in the
mid-1970s as output growth in these countries also slowed. As regards
developing countries, the rapid pace of industrialization in the Asian
region and in parts of Latin America in the 1960s through the early
19805has been linked with a rising intensity of resource use and appears
20 For a discussion of the factors behind the slowdown in growth, see, for
example, Adams, Fenton, and Larsen (1987).
to be related to the high levels of gross domestic investment during this
period. The subsequent picture. however. is mixed. as external financing
difficulties lowered investment and growth rates in many developing
countries. particularly in Africa and Latin America.
Surge in Supply
As shown in Borensztein and Reinhart (1994), supply conditions have
played a key role in explaining the weakness in commodity prices. partic-
. ularly since the mid-1980s. In part, the reasons for the supply response
in the 1980s can be found in the debt crisis and the need to adopt
adjustment policies that, among other things, aimed at increasing export
earnings by expanding export volumes. However, perhaps the most im-
portant factors behind the sharp and sustained increases in the supply of
numerous commodities during the past decade are the trends in technol-
ogy, information diffusion, and factor productivity. Although quantifica-
tion is often difficult, a number of important examples show where these
technology-driven shift factors can be important.
The diffusion of information about prices, techniques, and marketing
opportunities can cause significant increases in overall commodity sup-
plies by bringing new entrants into international markets. The emergence
during the 1980s of first Malaysia and then Indonesia as major cocoa
producers is one of the prime examples of this phenomenon. Whereas
producers other than these two.countries on aggregate increased produc-
tion by about 15 percem between i980-81 and 1991-92, Malaysia and
Indonesia increased theIr combined raw cocoa output by 500 percent.
During the 1970s, the larger plantations in Malaysia became aware that
the rise in real cocoa prices would make production profitable; decisions
were made to move into cocoa, and the rate of plantings accelerated
accordingly. Rising production levels and export earnings in Malaysia
did not go unnoticed by the authorities and agricultural companies in
Indonesia. As a result, plantings there grew rapidly through the mid- and
late-1980s. :md Indonesia rose from producing a small amount of spe-
cialty "fine" cocoa to producing 167,000 tons of mostly bulk cocoa in
1991-92. Although declines in cocoa prices since the mid-1980s have had
an effect on other (higher-cost) producers, cocoa production remains
profitable in Indonesia owing to high pr . :~uctivity.
Minerals and metals are also exampk:-. of how the accumulation of
knowledge and technological progress have led to significant shifts in
long-run supply curves. However, the most remarkable examples of
information diffusion and technologically driven productivity growth are
found in agriculture. Despite demand growth-particularly owing to high
rates of population growth in developing countries-the rise in produc-
tion has been such that real food prices have. except for a brief episode
in the mid-1970s, declined significantly in the postwar period. Whereas
land under cultivation has increased in many parts of the developing
world, a sustained increase in yields over time has played a major role
in the agricultural supply-demand equation. Cereals are the premier
example, but other crops have also registered significant increases in
yields. Advances in agroscience that have led to the development of
higher-yield and more disease-resistant varieties, the increased use of
fertilizers and pesticides, and the spread of irrigation are the principal
factors cited for the increases in agricultural yields (see Figure 7).
The improvements in technology are likely to be "irreversible" and are
not limited to a few commodities. These developments have had wide-
spread effects and have led to improved yields for many types of crops,
including beverages (cocoa, coffee, tea), oilseeds, vegetables, and agri-
cultural raw materials such as cotton. Innovation and information diffu-
sion win probably continue to playa significant role in increasing agricul-
tural yields still further (particularly in light of recent major advances in
biotechnology).
The agricultural policies of industrial countries have also undoubtedly
been an important factor in the rapid expansion in world commodity
supplies during the 1980s and have contributed to the weakness in prices
of many agricultural products. 21 National (or transnational in the case of
the European Union (EU)) agricultural policies typically act to stimulate
output and discourage consumption, thereby reducing import needs or
increasing supplies available for export. Such government intervention
has been a common feature in industrial countries in the post-World War
II period; however, a marked deterioration in the agricultural trade
environment took place in the 1980s. Wheat is an instructive example.
Price support under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy has been so
"effective" that wheat supplies surplus to the Union's requirements have
grown over time and have had to be sold on world markets, made possible
by the provision of export subsidies. Between 1980-81 and 1991-92,
wheat exports from the EU rose by 55 percent, to nearly 22 million tons
(an increase in market share from 14 percent to 20 percent).
Institutional Factors: International Commodity Agreements (ICAs)
Part of the blame for weakening commodity prices during the 1980sand
1990s is often attributed to the international community's failure to abide
21 Most partial and general equilibrium models suggest that real prices for most
agricultural products would rise if reforms were implemented by the industrial
countries. See Goldin and Knudsen (1990).
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by and support commodity agreements designed to help stabilize prices
and ensure a "fair" return to commodity producers. Several such agree-
ments were in effect during the 1970s and early 1980s. In June 1984 the
agreement covering sugar collapsed. Thereafter, other agreements fol-
lowed suit or became economically moribund: tin (October 1985), cocoa
(February 1988), coffee (July 1989), and natural rubber (April 1993). The
immediate impact on price of a breakdown in a commodity agreement
may have a large "temporary" component as prices spike downward; for
instance, beverage prices fell well below trend from mid-1987 to mid-1989
(Figures 3- 5).22 However, the effects of the breakdown are likely to have
an important "permanent" component as the behavior of exporters
adjusts to the more competitive regime. In effect. the evidence suggests
that, in addition to agricultural policies in industrial countries and the
technological innovations discussed above. the breakdown of the numer-
ous agreements has been a factor behind the sharp expansion in world
commodity supplies in recent years. In part, however, the breakdown of
a number of agreements reflects the difficulties of trying to influence
prices by managing output or other means in the face of developments
(such as productivity increases acting to foster an expansion in supplies).
Cyclical Factors
Weak Economic Performance in Recent Years in Industrial Countries
The lackluster economic performance of the industrial countries has
been cited as contributing to the recent weakness in real commodity
prices. As noted in the empirical literature (see, for example, Chu and
Morrison (1986)), industrial production in the developed countries is a
key determinant of commodity prices, with estimated elasticities gener-
ally clustered in the 1.0-2.0 range. Although the current environment is
not characterized as a deep recession, industrial production in the indus-
trial countries has been flat since 1989. However, as noted throughout
this paper, the bulk of the weakness in commodity prices appears to be
secular. A sizable negative cycle component in commodity prices, such
as those characterizing the 1975 and 1982 recessions in the United States
and other industrial countries (see Figure 5), is not currently present.
Further, Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) show that only a small fraction
of the variability in real commodity prices in 1989-92 is attributable to
output developments in industrial countries. Their analysis indicates that
22 Unless the breakdown of the leA was fully anticipated, in which case prices
would have already reacted.
developments in the former Soviet Union (discussed below) can account
for a more important share of the recent variability in commodity prices.
Falling Demand and Supply Shocks from the Former Soviet Union
The recent output collapse in the former Soviet Union (it is assumed.
for purposes of this discussion that the bulk of the decline is "temporary ,"
although evidently quite persistent) has depressed demand for a number
of imported commodities such as cocoa, corn, and tea. Further, demand
within the krmer Soviet Union for metals is reported to have fallen
sharply, pamcularly as armament production has declined. Hence, the
response by commodity producers in the former Soviet Union to this shift
in demand and the dislocation accompanying reform has caused supply
shocks in international commodity markets. This has been particularly
evident in the metals markets where, for example, zinc exports from the
former Soviet Union rose by nearly 700 percent during 1989-92. Exports
of metals to Western markets offered a ready means of raising large
amounts of much-needed forei~n exchange. However, although short-
ages of foreign exchange led :.,; official sanctioning of increased metal
exports to Western markets. the failure to liberalize domestic metals
prices fully in Russia and the other republics also created huge arbitrage
opportunities.2J
Hence. coupled with adverse cyclical conditions in the West, the
surge in the exports of metals from the former Soviet Union appear to
have contributed significantly to the weakening of commodity prices.
particularly metals prices. on international markets.
Both the volatility in real comfTlndity prices and the sustained decline
experienced over recent years pn.::,..;.ltserious challenges for many mem-
ber countries of the Fund and the World Bank because of the impact on
export earnings, domestic incomes (and hence private savings and invest-
ment), and government budgetary positions. The response to volatility
in commodity prices, however, raises issues that are quite different from
those emanating from secular changes in the average level of prices. It
is therefore crucial to interpret correctly market developments in each
2J Effective early in 1993. domestic prices for metals were liberalized and other
steps were also taken to reduce the scope for illegal trading.
case to be able to elaborate the appropriate policy response or. in fact.
to consider whether a policy response is even warranted.
Temporary Price Shocks and the Role of Government
in Smoothing Income
Temporary shocks to commodity prices affect both the private and
public sectors in the commodity producing countries. When racing tem-
porary changes in income, the optimal response by individual consumers
is to use saving and borrowing in an attempt to smooth the path of
consumption. Similarly, governments facing temporary changes in rev-
enue should adjust their spending to make it consistent with sustainable
levels.
A traditional argument for government to absorb the effects of com-
modity price fluctuations is based on microeconomic considerations re-
lating to the behavior of private agents.:~ If private agents bear all the
commodity price risk, they will tend to face variable and unpredictable
income streams over time, with possibly very limited opportunity to
smooth consumption. Therefore, it may be best for the government to
intervene to stabilize the prices received by private agents and thus
enhance the welfare of risk-averse individuals by permitting smoother
income and consumption streams.
Empirical evidence on savings behavior in developing countries is far
from conclusive, but it does suggest that consumption smoothing may
well take place more than is traditionally assumed.25 At the microeco-
nomic level, the evidence suggests that agents do react to commodity
price instability in a manner consistent with theory. Rice farmers in
Thailand. for example, smooth their consumption quite successfully
both within and between harvest years.:6 Also, an analysis of the coffee
boom of 1976-79 in Kenya found that as much as 60 percent of boom
income went into private savings; farmers were aware that the boom was
due to frost damage in Brazil and that their income gains were largely a
windfall. ~7 In contrast, governments in a number of countries have
found it difficult to manage the proceeds of temporary windfall gains
well. Thus, the evidence suggests that governments may be well advised
to reassess their intervention strategies and the responsibility they assume
for managing commodity price risk at the country level.
24See Deaton (1992).
25See Ostry and Reinhart (1992).
26See Paxson (1993).
27 See Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1987).
With fluctuations in international commodity prices affecting the do-
mestic economy, the types of intervention employed have been varied:
the strategies most often used and their problems are outlined below.
Stabilization Funds and Agricultural Boards
Stabilization funds have been designed to deal with the impact of
commodity price volatility on government revenues, especially in coun-
tries heavily dependent on metals and minerals. These funds act as a
buffer for government expenditures and financing and have at least two
appealing features. First. they impose a rule on governments. designed
to use resources optimally from a long-term perspective. The rule should
lessen the risk that governments may be tempted to increase spending
excessively during temporary booms. Second, the funds are an institu-
tional device through which governments can even out their expendi-
tures, since countries, as well as individuals, may be limited in their ability
to smooth spending because of lack of access to international financial
markets.
The other principal type of institutional structure fe; government
intervention has been the state-owned agricultural board or fund. These
institutions are usually charged with a domestic price stabIlization func-
tion, the transfer of explicit export taxes to the central government, and
a role in determining the extent to which operating surpluses are chan-
neled into a formal stabilization fund or are transferred directly to the
central government (or to other uses). The experience with these types
of funds or boards raises a number of issues about their desirability. First.
stabilization schemes that transfer most of the effects of commodity price
fluctuations to the government may tend to exacerbate a country's fiscal
management problems. For some countries the exercise of sufficient
control over government expenditure (particularly during boom periods)
is likely to pose serious difficulties. Also, to achieve a significant amount
of income smoothing, a fund may have to hold a relatively high level of
foreign reserves or be able to borrow from international capital markets
for stabilization purposes during downturns in commodity prices. A
relatively high level of foreign reserves (on average) is necessary because
temporary commodity price shocks are quite persistent and revert slowly
to trend, and many developing countries do not enjoy a credit rating
enabling them to obtain substantial resources from private foreign
sources.
In addition, such schemes are not easily implemented. For stabilization
funds, one major problem is to set an appropriate benchmark price to
determine at what rate the fund should make disbursements. Agricultural
boards face a similar problem. as they are vulnerable to the difficulty of
ascertaining ex ante the appropriate price level around which incomes
should be stabilized. Both schemes require an evaluation of the tempo-
rariness of price shocks, and, as the earlier analysis indicates, such an
evaluation may be particularly difficult because the underlying trend in
prices seems to be time varying. Indeed, the difficulties that many stabi-
lization schemes experienced from the mid-1980s onward can be traced
to a failure to take into account the negative and variable trend in
commodity prices.
International Commodity Agreements
As volatility in international commodity prices affects the economies
of all primary product exporters, the notion of some kind of cooperative
commodity agreement to try to achieve greater stability in international
commodity prices is obviously well based. Two aspects of ICAs should
be differentiated. First, ICAs may attempt to increase the average price
of a commodity by in some way restricting its supply. Second, ICAs may
simply limit price variability, for example, by allowing recourse to buffer
stocks. However, ICAs run the risk of trying to stabilize prices around
the "wrong" (nonmarket clearing) price, which can quickly lead to fi-
nancial non viability or to the collapse of output-sharing arrangements.
As the experience of the 1980s and 19905 shows, the prospects for ICAs
to playa role in addressing the issues raised by recent international
commodity price behavior appear poor.
External Compensatory Finance
Another means of trying to smooth the effects of negative temporary
commodity price shocks for credit-rationed developing countries has
been external finance from the IMF under the compensatory financing
facility and subsequently the compensatory and contingency financing
facility and from the EU under the STAB EX scheme.28 The compensa-
tory element of the compensatory and contingency financing facility is
designed to work when export earnings are hit by a temporary price
shock; the destabilizing impact of the shock can then be offset in part by
drawing under the facility, subject to early identification of the shortfall,
access limits, and an appropriate policy response. Similarly, the contin-
gency element of the facility is designed, through a mix of financing and
28 Such comfensatory finance is a loan or a grant to the monetary authority or
government 0 the country. It need not therefore necessarily find its way to those
most directly affected by an export shortfall.
adjustment. to . "::0 prevent member countries' programs supported by
Fund resources frum h ing thrown off course by unanticipated shocks to
key exogenous variacles such as commodity prices. Clearly, the design
of policy responses a d the form of Fund assistance to eligible countries
should take into account the nature of the commodity price shock, which
involves ascertaining ex ante its temporariness.
Market-Related Instruments
In addition to the possibility of reacting ex post to commodity price
changes, countries may be able to trade away much of the commodity
price risk by using financial securities such as futures and options. Pro-
ducer countries can then limit their exposure to unanticipated price
changes while investors in other countries assume it.
The volatility of commodity prices rose sharply in the early 1970s, and
although the problem does not seem to have worsened appreciably in
recent years, this feature of commodity price behavior has increased the
attractiveness of hedging instruments. In addition to well-developed
futures and options markets with short-dated instruments for commodi-
ties, financial innovation has led to developments in other instruments
(commodity swaps, commodity options, commodity-linked bonds, for-
wards), which have increased the scope for hedging commodity risk (see
Claessens and Duncan (1994)). Nevertheless, establishing a coherent
hedging strategy is not a straightforward proposition, and the use by
developing countries of futures and derivative markets has increased
slowly.
Several factors explain developing countries' limited use of these in-
struments. For instance. maturities tend to be limited to one to two years
and market thinness is a problem for the longer-dated maturities. There
are also the costs of hedging in the form of brokerage fees and the
like. Creditworthiness considerations make it considerably more difficult
for many developing countries to gain access to other financial markets,
particularly for nonstandard contracts and longer-dated instruments.
Nevertheless, access to '·.I'ch markets could be improved if exchange
controls and other barriers to hedging risk in commodity exporting
countries were removed.
As well as international commodity price variability, commoditv ex-
porting countries in recent years have also faced a downward trene ,:, real
commodity prices. It may well be unwise to base policies on the assump-
tion that the weakness in real commodity prices will be quickly overcome.
A stronger economic recovery in the industrial countries would certainly
help, as would continuing high rates of growth in the newly industrializing
countries. Some supply-side factors may ease over time (such as recent
shocks to metals markets from the former Soviet Union), but other
factors (such as structural changes in exporting countries and productivity
gains owing to technical progress) seem unlikely to be reversed. The
decline in commodity prices poses the question of what-if any-are the
appropriate structural policies for exporting countries, in particular with
regard to resource allocation and international trade.
The lessons from the experience in Latin America with inward-looking
development strategies are that whereas a negative terms of trade shock
is certainly an adverse development from an exporting country's view-
point, adding distortions to the domestic economy does not improve the
situation. The increasing body of evidence on cross-country growth
performance indicates that distortions to international trade and market-
oriented resource allocation can have adverse effects on economic
efficiency and growth.
The experience of the fastest growing developing countries shows that
their export structures have evolved over time toward greater diversi-
fication (Table I). The recent review of the high-performing Asian
economies provides some guidance on how such diversification was
achieved. 29
First, whereas agriculture's share of output and employment in these
economies has declined significantly over time, growth in agricultural
output and productivity was much higher than in other developing coun-
tries. The governments of these high-performing Asian economies sup-
ported the agricultural sector through extension services. agricultural
research. pilot schemes. significant investment in irrigation and rural
infrastructure (roads. bridges, electricity, and water supplies). and non-
punitive crop taxation. The experience of these economies indicates that
establishing a dynamic agricultural sector is an important phase in the
diversification process; for lower-income countries the message is that
failure to attach sufficiently high priority to agriculture in favor of other
sectors is likely to be counterproductive.
Second, in addition to policies that generally provided a stable macro-
economic environment, the high-performing Asian economies facilitated
29 The review of the performance of these economies provides a detailed
assessment of the reasons and policies behind their growth performance. See
World Bank (1993).
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Figure A.I. Real Comrrwdity Prices: Testing for a Break in Trend
1957:1-1993:11
5.2 6.0
AU Commodities Beverages
5.0 5.5
4.8 5.0
4.6 4.5
4.4
4.0
61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 57 6 J 65 69 73 77 8 J 85 89 93
4.0
57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93
Sources: IMF,lnternational Financial Statistics, and the authors.
Notes: The broken straight line is a fitted trend (by OLS) that allows for a change
in intercept and slope at 1973:1 for the all-commodity and food indices. For
beverages and metals. the breaks occur at 1976:1and 1974:III. respectively.
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